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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two hypotheticals:
Elizabeth, an eighteen-year-old high school graduate, applies for
a cashier position at a prominent national retailer. Following a
successful interview, she is offered the position and presented with an
employment contract to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The
employment agreement includes a waiver of Elizabeth’s right to a
* J.D. 2001, New York University School of Law. Mr. Chuang is corporate counsel for an
international technology company and previously served as law clerk to the Honorable Saundra
Brown Armstrong, United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The
author thanks Professor Eric C. Christiansen and Sean C. Beougher for their helpful comments
and suggestions.
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jury trial. Elizabeth signs the agreement. Elizabeth works for the
retailer full-time for five years and in that time is promoted to shift
supervisor. She notices, however, that all male employees with similar
performance reviews and seniority have been promoted to store
managers. Elizabeth strongly believes that she has been denied
opportunities for promotion on the basis of her gender and decides to
sue her employer. Elizabeth takes her case to various plaintiff’s
attorneys but none will take it for fear that her jury trial waiver will
result in a de minimis recovery. Undaunted, Elizabeth files a lawsuit
against her employer in pro per. Throughout the litigation, she makes
critical mistakes due to her legal inexperience. Finally, her employer
offers her $5,000.00 to settle the matter. Elizabeth accepts the
settlement.
Sarah, an eighteen-year-old high school graduate, applies for a
cashier position at a prominent national grocer. Following a
successful interview, she is offered the position and presented with an
employment contract to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The
employment agreement does not include a waiver of Sarah’s right to a
jury trial. Sarah signs the agreement. Sarah works for the grocer fulltime for five years and in that time is promoted to shift supervisor.
She notices, however, that all male employees with similar
performance reviews and seniority have been promoted to store
managers. Like Elizabeth, Sarah strongly believes that she has been
denied opportunities for promotion on the basis of her gender and
decides to sue her employer. Sarah takes her case to various plaintiff’s
attorneys. After reviewing the facts of Sarah’s case and weighing the
likely outcome of a jury trial, a prominent plaintiff’s attorney takes
her case on contingency. The attorney helps Sarah amass substantial
evidence of gender discrimination by her employer. Sarah’s attorney
contacts her employer and threatens to sue. During the subsequent
negotiations, Sarah’s attorney makes it clear that they are prepared to
take the case to the jury. Before the suit is even filed, Sarah’s
employer offers to settle the case for $1,000,000.00, which Sarah
accepts.
As exemplified by the foregoing hypotheticals, a jury trial waiver
can significantly affect the perceived value of a plaintiff’s case.
Indeed, in 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice found that the
amount awarded to victorious plaintiffs varied significantly depending
1
on whether the case was decided by a jury or a judge. The difference
1. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE

CHUANG ARTICLE

2006]

6/30/2006 1:04:22 PM

BURDEN OF PROOF IN JURY WAIVERS

207

between the award amounts was particularly striking in employment
discrimination cases, where victorious plaintiffs were awarded a
median of $218,000 from juries as compared to only $40,000 from
2
judges. Not surprisingly, many employers have sought to avoid the
greater risk inherent in jury trials by requiring their employees to use
3
alternate dispute resolution methods such as arbitration. But the use
of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment
4
context carries its own distinct disadvantages. Accordingly, some
commentators are advocating for increased use of pre-dispute
contractual jury waivers as a way to manage employment litigation
5
risk.
But while jury waivers can be an attractive alternative to
arbitration on the one hand and jury trials on the other, judicial
6
treatment of such waivers has been quite varied. Two state supreme
courts, California and Georgia, have ruled that pre-dispute
7
contractual jury waivers are not enforceable. Those jurisdictions that
permit such waivers use a wide array of “safeguards not typical of

STATISTICS BULLETIN: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, AT 5-6 (Apr. 2004), available at <http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf>.
2. Id. at 6. The survey found that the median amount awarded to plaintiff winners in
federal district courts was also higher in jury trial cases than in bench trial cases. Id. at 7.
Although the survey did not specify the median award amount in federal employment
discrimination cases, it found that the median award in federal jury trial cases involving
“contract,” a category which included employment discrimination cases, was $330,000 as
compared to only $226,000 in bench trial cases. Id. at 7, 10-11.
3. See, e.g., Dianne LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to Arbitration of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 934 (2005); Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival
or Jury Reviled? When Employees are Compelled to Waiver Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 767, 768-70 (2005).
4. See infra, Part II.B.
5. See, e.g., Harold M. Brody & Anthony J. Oncidi, Careful What You Wish For: Is
Arbitration the Employer’s Panacea? Perhaps There is a Better Alternative, 9 HR ADVISOR:
LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 7 (noting that jury trial waivers, as
opposed to arbitration, are a “better way to shield employers from the risk and expense
associated with jury trials”); Samuel Estreicher & Rene M. Johnson, Contractual Jury Trial
Waivers in Federal Employment Litigation, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 2003, at 3 (noting that
“practitioners are increasingly considering contractual jury trial waivers”); LaRocca, supra note
3, at 954-59 (arguing that jury trial waivers allow employers and employees to avoid the
disadvantages of arbitration); Chad Shultz, The Jury’s Still Out – Way Out: Subtracting the Jury
From the Equation Decreases Uncertainty in Employment Cases, 50 HR MAG., Jan. 2005, at 97
(suggesting that employers use jury waivers in lieu of arbitration).
6. See infra, Part III.B & C.
7. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 488 (Cal. 2005) (holding that state
statute does not authorize pre-dispute waiver of the right to jury trial); Bank South N.A. v.
Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994) (holding that neither the Georgia constitution nor state
statute provide for pre-litigation contractual waivers of jury trial).
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commercial law” to protect the constitutional right to jury trial. The
multiple safeguards used by courts, and the different ways of applying
them led the California Supreme Court to note “the difficulties
experienced in other jurisdictions [with respect to pre-dispute jury
waivers], where disagreements persist concerning such matters as
allocation of the burden of proof when a party resists enforcement of
9
a contractual waiver of jury trial.” These disagreements must be
settled before such waivers can be used appropriately and effectively.
This Article resolves the burden of proof question by arguing
that several factors support assigning the burden of proof to the party
seeking enforcement of the waiver, which in employer-employee
disputes will usually be the employer. Allocating the proof burden in
this way will standardize judicial treatment of pre-dispute jury
waivers, allowing them to be used optimally to manage the risks of
dispute resolution.
Part II of this Article assesses the use of pre-dispute jury waivers
in the employment context and explains their appeal. Part III
analyzes the various ways that federal courts have treated pre-dispute
jury waivers and notes specific inconsistencies in the treatment of
such waivers in several recent federal employment cases. Part IV
argues that in the employment context, public policy considerations,
and convenience and fairness concerns, all call for assigning the
burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement of the waiver.
II. PRE-DISPUTE CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes a
constitutional right to a jury trial in legal actions in federal court,
10
including diversity jurisdiction cases.
In addition, federal
11
employment law statutes such as Title VII and the Age
12
13
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) grant jury trial rights.
8. Grafton Partners, 116 P.3d at 491 & n.12. For a more extensive discussion of the
safeguards used by courts, see infra, note 57 & accompanying text.
9. Grafton Partners, 116 P.3d at 492; see also Shultz, supra note 5 (“It is safe to assume
that lawyers who represent employees will challenge the validity of jury waiver agreements.”);
Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that there is “little guidance” regarding “whether,
when and how an employer may implement a jury trial waiver program”). For a more extensive
discussion of the disagreements between various jurisdictions, see infra, Part III.B.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
12. U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2006) (amending Title VII to permit jury trials); 29 U.S.C. §
626(c)(2) (2000) (granting jury trial rights under the ADEA).
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From a risk management perspective, however, many employers find
14
a jury’s legendary unpredictability to be unacceptable.
A. The Problem with Juries
Most employers believe that juries are more likely than judges to
find against wealthy or corporate defendants and more likely than
15
judges to award large damages to victorious plaintiffs. Furthermore,
according to prevailing wisdom, juries generally “favor the little guy
against the big one, the simpler case rather than the one more
difficult to understand, local interests rather than those situated
farther away, emotional appeals to right versus wrong rather than
strict application of the law and more attractive witnesses rather than
16
those lacking a cordial appearance.” These concerns have motivated
many employers to adopt alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
to handle employment disputes.
17
A substantial number of employers currently use arbitration. By
submitting disputes to an arbitrator rather than to a jury, both
employers and employees expect reduced costs, faster resolutions,
18
greater privacy and increased predictability. But recently, numerous
concerns have been raised regarding the continued use of arbitrators
in employment disputes.
B. The Problem with Arbitration
Critics of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements argue
that by providing a private, less costly way for employees to bring

14. Robert S. Blumberg & Ariel D. Weindling, A|S|A|P, A Littler Mendelson Time
Sensitive Newsletter, California Edition (Aug. 2005), available at, <http://www.littler.com/
presspublications/index.cfm?event=pubItem&pubItemID=12181&childViewID=250&type=all>
(“Among the greatest fears of many employers is the chance that a runaway jury could impose a
potentially ruinous verdict in a wrongful discharge or harassment matter.”); see Shultz, supra
note 5 (“Jury trials . . . are notoriously unpredictable. . . . mak[ing] it difficult to assess the
wisdom of a decision to continue or settle.”).
15. See Jerry Custis, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, § 8:32 (2004).
16. Id.
17. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that a “substantial number” of
employers “employing millions of employees” have adopted arbitration); LaRocca, supra note
3, at 933-34 (writing that in 1997, 19 percent of private sector employers were using arbitration
and that in 2001, six million employees were covered by employment arbitration plans
administered by the American Arbitration Association); Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille,
Judicial Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 252 (2003) (“The substitution of mandatory arbitration for discrimination
lawsuits is the most significant employment law development since the early 1990s.”).
18. LaRocca, supra note 3, at 935-37.
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discrimination claims, such agreements expose employers to a greater
19
number of discrimination claims. Employers are also finding that
arbitration does not offer a significant improvement over litigation in
terms of time and costs saved. Experience has shown that resolution
times for disputes that are arbitrated are not significantly faster than
20
disputes that are litigated in court. Moreover, arbitrators typically do
not grant summary judgment, further prolonging the case and
21
increasing costs. Arbitration costs also include fees for preparing and
conducting the arbitration, and deciding discovery disputes and law
and motion proceedings – all costs which are publicly funded in a
22
court proceeding. This is a particular burden on employers as they
23
are often saddled with the entire cost of the arbitration.
Arbitrating a dispute also requires both employers and
employees to accept procedures that may differ from those provided
by statute, as well as limited judicial recourse in the event of an
24
adverse outcome. There is also continuing debate in the courts, as
well as among commentators, regarding the judicial enforceability of
25
mandatory arbitration agreements. All of these problems with
19. See id at 938-42; Shultz, supra note 5 (writing that arbitration may encourage claims).
20. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7.
21. See id. (stating that arbitration is often not much faster than, and can be as expensive
as, court litigation, that arbitrators rarely grant motions for summary judgment and that
arbitrators often “split-the-baby” and issue compromise awards); Shultz, supra note 5 (writing
that arbitrators “seldom dismiss cases without a hearing, even when there is no arguable basis
for a claim”).
22. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 939.
23. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that plaintiff’s attorneys often do not
oppose arbitration because they can litigate “largely at the employer’s expense”).
24. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 940; LeRoy, supra note 3, at 777-80 (noting that the use
of arbitrators as adjudicators of employment disputes is now questioned due to, inter alia, high
damages awards and extremely deferential standard of judicial review).
25. See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 17, at 313-26 (noting “surprising evidence of judicial
resistance to these mandatory [arbitration] arrangements.”). Much has been written regarding
how mandatory arbitration agreements should be enforced, if at all. See generally Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 676 (2001) (arguing that the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial should limit the ability of parties to impose binding arbitration).
Some argue that a knowing and voluntary standard of consent should be applied to pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements. See id.; Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and
Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of
Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2002); but see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses,
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 168 (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act
cannot “plausibly be interpreted to require knowing consent or any other standards of consent
except those used by contract law”). Still others argue that it is inequitable to enforce executory
agreements to arbitrate between employers and employees. See generally, Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 449, 450-54 (1996).
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arbitration have spurred many employers to reconsider the use of
26
arbitration to resolve employment disputes.
C. Are Pre-Dispute Jury Waivers The Solution?
“EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO IRREVOCABLY
WAIVES ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY
ACTION, PROCEEDING OR COUNTERCLAIM ARISING
OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT.”27

Pre-dispute contractual jury waivers such as the one quoted
above, are increasingly being used by employers as an alternative way
28
to mitigate risk. Such waivers offer some of the benefits of both
arbitration and jury trials. Like a jury trial, a bench trial allows parties
to take full advantage of our court system because it provides litigants
with procedural and evidentiary protections that may not otherwise
29
be available in arbitration. Judges are generally more receptive to
30
dispositive motions than are arbitrators. Court proceedings also
permit greater post-judgment judicial review than is available
31
following an arbitration award.
Much like arbitration, bench trials offer potentially significant
time and cost savings when compared to jury trials. This is because
32
bench trials are generally concluded much faster than jury trials. In
addition, in a bench trial, parties are spared the costs of selecting a
33
jury, tailoring the case to a jury, and settling jury instructions.
26. See Ryan Griffitts, Jury Waiver Agreements Revisited, THOMPSON COE LAB. & EMP.
NEWS, Spring 2005, at 2, available at <http://www.thompsoncoe.com/Portals/0/LEN-06-02.pdf>
(law firm newsletter noting more employers are using jury waivers in their employment
agreements).
27. This pre-dispute jury waiver is reproduced from an actual employment agreement that
was litigated in federal court. Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004
WL 306110, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004) (emphasis original).
28. See Blumberg & Weindling, supra note 14 (stating that many employers use pre dispute
jury waivers to avoid “the great uncertainty which comes with jury trial, while both avoiding the
cost of arbitration and retaining the right to appeal”); LeRoy, supra note 3, at 769 (noting some
employers are discarding arbitration in favor of jury waivers); see also Shultz, supra note 5
(writing that a jury waiver diminishes the value of a plaintiff’s case).
29. See LaRocca, supra note 3, at 955 (“Because a judge is bound by Title VII and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, employees [and employers] are guaranteed appropriate
statutes of limitations, unbiased selection of the decision maker, appropriate cost allocations,
judicial expertise, full appellate rights, appropriate punitive damages, and appropriate
remedies.”).
30. See Brody & Oncidi, supra note 5, at 7.
31. See Estreicher & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1.
32. See Cohen & Smith, supra note 1, at tbls. 2 & 8 (stating that 77 percent of non-jury
cases were decided within two years as compared to only 56.9 percent of jury cases, and that
jury trials lasted an average of 4.3 days compared to only 1.9 days for bench trials).
33. See Custis, supra note 15, at § 8:32.
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Finally, submitting a dispute to a judge rather than a jury minimizes
34
employers’ fears of excessive jury awards.
In certain situations, a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver can
35
offer clear advantages to the employer, and serve as “an attractive
middle ground between jury trials, on the one hand, and arbitration,
36
on the other.” But as use of such waivers has increased, serious
37
questions have arisen regarding their treatment in the courts. Part
III of this Article examines the disparate ways federal courts, and in
38
particular federal courts adjudicating employment disputes, have
analyzed pre-dispute contractual jury waivers.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PRE-DISPUTE JURY WAIVERS
The right to a trial by jury in a civil lawsuit may be waived by a
39
prior written agreement. Federal courts examining pre-dispute jury
34. See Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J.
concurring).
35. If the choice is between a bench trial and arbitration, the additional procedural and
evidentiary protections afforded by a bench trial can also be beneficial to the employee. If the
choice is between a bench trial and a jury trial, however, few employees are likely to choose the
bench trial because from the employee’s perspective, the cost and time savings afforded by a
bench trial are minor considerations, since most cases are taken on a contingency basis. See
David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the
Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 73, 89 (1999) (noting that few employee-plaintiffs can afford attorneys and most
retain them on a contingency basis). Moreover, the potential cost savings must be weighed
against the perception that juries are more likely than judges to find for employee-plaintiffs. See
supra Part II.A.
36. Grafton Partners v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 511, 519 n.10 (Cal. App. 2004),
depublished by, 88 P.3d 204 (Cal. 2004), aff’d and superseded by, 116 P.3d 479 (Cal. 2005)
(“Agreements to resolve future disputes by court trial may alleviate fears of excessive jury
awards while providing greater procedural protections than arbitration in many respects,
including discovery, securing an impartial factfinder, and appeal, among others. It is noteworthy
that the reduction of such rights in the arbitral forum, as well as the unique costs imposed by
arbitration, have troubled California courts.”).
37. See infra Part III.
38. This Article limits its scope to federal employment cases because federal statutes and
federal employment claims make up a prominent portion of the body of employment law and
most plaintiffs with both federal and state employment claims will end up litigating their claims
in a federal court. See Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State
and Federal Employment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 502-03 (1997)
(writing that “individuals who pursue their state and federal rights in the same proceeding may
be required to litigate those rights in a federal forum, because an employer against whom both
state and federal claims are brought in state court ordinarily can remove the entire action to
federal court”); Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment
on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 664 n.69 (1994) (noting employers routinely remove
employment discrimination cases filed in state court to federal court).
39. See, e.g., Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988)
(“Agreements waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public
policy,”); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It is clear that the
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waivers have overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary
40
consent standard to such waivers. But critically, the courts have not
agreed whether the party seeking to enforce or the party seeking to
avoid the waiver should bear the burden of proof that the waiver was
41
entered into knowingly and voluntarily.
This Part reviews judicial treatment of contractual jury waivers
and discusses several recent federal district court cases that
confronted such waivers in the context of an employer-employee
dispute.
A. Knowing Consent Requirement
Prior to the 1970s, most courts examined contractual jury waivers
42
using contract law standards of consent. As stated by Professor
Stephen J. Ware:
Under contract law’s objective standards of consent, signing (or
otherwise manifesting assent to) such a document is, with few
exceptions, consent to the terms on the document. The signature’s
“blanket assent” is good enough. Neither reading nor
understanding
the terms is necessary to make those terms
43
enforceable.

In 1977, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit became one
of the first courts to articulate a knowing-consent requirement in the
44
context of contractual jury waivers. In National Equipment Rental,
45
Ltd. v. Hendrix, H. Walter Hendrix, III (“Hendrix”) purchased a
tractor-scraper and a bulldozer from two separate dealers that he was
parties to a contract may by prior written agreement waive the right to jury trial.”); Cooperative
Finance Ass’n., Inc. v. Garst, 871 F.Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (collecting cases).
40. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 756 (citing, National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.1977)); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ’g
Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ. 0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004)
(citing, Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603 (S.D.N.Y.1999)); Morris v.
McFarland Clinic, P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Jan.
29,2004) (citing, Coop. Fin. Ass’n., Inc. v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D. Iowa 1995)); N.
Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Dreiling
v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F.Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982).
41. Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 491 n.12 (Cal. 2005); see Med. Air
Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The circuits are currently split
on the question of which party bears the burden of proof as to whether a contractual jury trial
waiver was knowing and voluntary.”).
42. Ware, supra note 25, at 201-02; Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for Judicial SelfRestraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 431, 444-47 (1997).
43. Ware, supra note 25, at 171.
44. Id. at 202.
45. 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977).
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subsequently unable to pay for. Hendrix approached National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. (“NER”) for a loan to settle his accounts
47
with the two dealers. The loan agreements were characterized by
48
NER as “equipment leases.” Hendrix eventually defaulted and NER
49
seized the tractor-scraper and the bulldozer. NER sold the
equipment and sued Hendrix to collect the remaining balance due on
50
the two leases. A jury found that the lease agreements were actually
51
usurious loan agreements, void under New York State law. NER
appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Hendrix was improperly granted a
jury trial in the face of a contractual clause in the leases waiving such
52
a right. Affirming the trial court’s decision to grant Hendrix’s
demand for a jury trial despite having signed a contractual predispute jury waiver, the Second Circuit reasoned, “It is elementary
that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury is fundamental and that
its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intentionally.
53
Indeed, a presumption exists against its waiver.”
46. Id. at 256.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 257.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 258 (citations omitted). There is considerable scholarship discussing whether the
knowing consent standard established in Hendrix was adequately supported by precedent. First,
the Hendrix court failed to acknowledge that it relied on a criminal case involving jury waiver
(where courts have long applied higher consent standards for constitutional waivers) and a case
involving an attorney’s oral waiver during a pretrial conference (as distinguished from a predispute contractual waiver) for this standard. See Matties, supra note 42, at 446-47; Ware, supra
note 25, at 203. Second, while the Hendrix court acknowledged that the Supreme Court upheld
the contractual waiver of the right to personal service without employing a knowing consent
standard in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the court
distinguished Szukhent by stating that “the right to a jury trial . . . is far more fundamental than
the right to personal service, and cannot be waived absent a showing that its relinquishment is
knowing and intentional.” 565 F.2d at 258 n.1. Curiously, the Hendrix court provided no
authority or reasoning for such a statement or to explain “why the standard for civil waivers of
constitutional rights should differ when the right is found in the Seventh Amendment as
opposed to the Due Process Clause.” Ware, supra note 25, at 203; see Matties, supra note 42, at
447. Indeed, Professor Ware argues that “Hendrix was already out of step with the Supreme
Court when it was decided in 1977, and it is now farther out of step with a modern Supreme
Court.” Ware, supra note 25, at 203; but see Matties, supra note 42, at 447 (arguing that despite
its flaws in reasoning, Hendrix correctly recognized the importance of the civil jury in federal
court); Sternlight, supra note 25, at 677-80 (arguing that contractual waivers of jury trial rights
are permissible only when the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intentional and identifying
Hendrix as a “leading case”).
Given that “lower courts have virtually uniformly held that such waivers are only valid
when they meet a [knowing consent] standard,” id. at 679, this Article focuses on clarifying the
allocation of the burden of proof when a party resists enforcement of a jury waiver and does not
address whether the knowing consent standard is the correct standard.
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The Hendrix court found that the jury waiver clause at issue
“fail[ed] to overcome this presumption. . . . [because it] was set deeply
54
and inconspicuously in the contract.” The court further found that
the waiver was neither knowing nor intentional in light of the “gross
inequality in bargaining power” between the parties, given that
Hendrix “did not have any choice but to accept the . . . contract as
55
written if he was to get badly needed funds.”
After Hendrix, courts have consistently applied the knowing
consent standard to jury waivers, characterizing it using such words as
56
“knowing,” “voluntary” and/or “intentional.” As Professor Jean R.
Sternlight observes:
While courts have not adopted an identical phrasing of the factors
to be considered in examining contractual jury trial waivers, there is
substantial agreement regarding what kinds of information is
relevant. Courts typically consider any actual negotiations over the
clause, whether the clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the degree of bargaining
disparity between the parties, and the experience and sophistication
of the party opposing the waiver. Courts have not been explicit as
to how these factors
relate to one another, but seem to consider
57
them all together.

B. Allocation of the Burden of Proof

58

While courts may agree on the types of information relevant to
the knowing and voluntary consent inquiry, many have failed to
address “the important question” of which party bears the burden of
59
proving that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
54. Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258.
55. Id.
56. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 678-79 (observing that courts use different combinations of
knowing, voluntary and intentional to describe the standard).
57. Id. at 680. Professor Sternlight provides a detailed discussion of the information courts
typically find most relevant: (1) negotiability of the waiver; (2) conspicuousness of the waiver;
(3) disparity of bargaining power between the parties; and (4) business or professional
experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver. See id. at 681-90.
58. The Supreme Court recently observed that “[t]he term ‘burden of proof’ is one of the
‘slipperiest member[s] of the family of legal terms.’” Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 533 (Nov.
14, 2005) (citing 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §342, at 433 (John William Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999)). This is because the term “encompasses two separate burdens of proof. One burden is
that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.” 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 336; see Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 533-34 (citing Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Progs. v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)). However, the term “burden of proof” is now
generally limited to the burden of persuasion. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272-76.
59. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 691; see, e.g., Allyn v. Western United Life Assur. Co., 347
F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251-52 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that Eleventh Circuit had not resolved the
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While some district courts have placed the burden of proof on the
60
party seeking enforcement of the waiver, two circuits have expressly
61
split over the issue, and most other appellate courts have declined to
62
resolve the question.
The confusion surrounding the allocation of the burden of proof
may stem from the Hendrix court’s failure to elaborate on the origin
of this presumption or explain how it was to be applied. As support
for its “presumption” the Hendrix court merely cited to Aetna
63
Insurance Co. v. Kennedy. But while the Supreme Court did state in
Aetna that “as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts indulge
64
every reasonable presumption against waiver,” Aetna involved a jury
waiver during litigation and not a pre-dispute contractual jury
65
waiver. As discussed infra, this is an important distinction that
makes it difficult to analogize the reasoning in Aetna to cases
burden question and declining to address it).
60. See, e.g., Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at
*1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex.
2002); Luis Acosta, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 920 F .Supp. 15, 18 (D.P.R. 1996); Dreiling v. Peugeot
Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo.1982).
61. Compare Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that
“the party seeking enforcement of the [jury] waiver must prove that consent was both voluntary
and informed”), with, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 758 (6th Cir.1985) (holding
that “in the context of an express contractual [jury] waiver the objecting party should have the
burden of demonstrating that its consent to the provisions was not knowing and voluntary”).
62. See, e.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2002);
Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 435 n.4 (7th Cir.1997); Hulsey v.
West, 966 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir.1992).
63. 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
64. Id. at 393.
65. The parties in Aetna, after introducing their evidence at trial and agreeing upon the
amount of loss, each submitted requests for peremptory jury instructions and for a directed
verdict in their respective favor. Id. at 392. The trial court refused to direct for either party and
submitted the case to the jury. Id. The jury found for defendants and plaintiff appealed. Id. The
appeals court found, inter alia, that “by their requests for peremptory instructions, plaintiff and
defendants assumed the facts to be undisputed and submitted to the trial judge the
determination of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence and so took the cases from the
jury.” Id. The appeals court further held that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain verdicts
for defendants and remanded the cases to the trial court with directions to give plaintiff
judgment for the agreed amount of the loss. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning:
The established rule is that where plaintiff and defendant respectively request
peremptory instructions, and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be
undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences
properly to be drawn from them . . . But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. . . . Here neither the plaintiff nor
the defendants applied for directed verdicts without more. With their requests for
peremptory instructions they submitted other requests that reasonably may be held to
amount to applications that, if a peremptory instruction is not given, the cases be
submitted to the jury. Indeed, we find nothing in the record to support the view that
the parties waived their right of trial by jury or authorized the judge to decide any issue
of fact.
Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added).
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66

involving pre-dispute contractual jury waivers.
Those courts that have resolved the burden of proof question
merely follow the pronouncements of Hendrix and Aetna without
67
thorough analysis. Some courts place the burden on the party
seeking to avoid the waiver clause to preserve society’s interest in
68
freedom of contract. Those courts that assign the burden to the party
seeking to enforce the waiver contend that the interest in preserving
freedom of contract is outweighed by society’s “greater interest in
69
guarding the fundamental right to a jury.” The following
examination of several recent employment cases that confronted predispute jury waivers highlights this disagreement.
C. Review of Case Law Reveals Inconsistent Treatment of Waivers
I have found three federal opinions discussing employee
challenges to pre-dispute contractual jury waivers, all decided within
70
the last several years. Although this sample is small, given that the
71
use of such waivers in the employment context is relatively new, and
given the number of employment lawyers that are encouraging their
66. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir.1986) (placing burden
on party seeking enforcement of waiver and citing Hendrix but failing to distinguish the Sixth
Circuit’s contrary holding in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th
Cir.1985)); Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *1
(S.D. Jan. 29, Iowa 2004) (concluding that party seeking enforcement of waiver has burden
without analysis); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Publ’g Group, LLC, No. 03 Civ.
0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004) (same); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v.
Powell 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (same); N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker
Motors Corp., 572 F .Supp. 310, 313 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (same).
68. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 758.
69. Hydramar, Inc. v. General Dynamics Corp., Civ. A. No.85-1788, 1989 WL 159267, at *2
(E.D. Pa. 1989).
70. There is a fourth case, Hammaker v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D.
Va. 2002), that addresses pre-dispute jury waivers in the context of an ADEA claim. Although
the employment agreement that plaintiff signed in Hammaker contained a jury waiver, the court
found that the waiver did not conform to the requirements imposed by the Older Workers
Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA). Id. at 581. In finding that the OWBPA’s waiver
requirements apply to procedural rights, such as the right to a jury trial, the court declined to
follow several circuit court holdings to the contrary. Id. at 579-80. As of the date of this Article,
no court has followed Hammaker’s lead and one district court has specifically declined to do so.
See Schappert, No. 03 Civ. 0058 (RMB), 2004 WL 1661073, at *10; see also Browning v. 24 Hour
Fitness, Inc., No. C05-5152RB, 2006 WL 151933 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2006). Of more
relevance to this Article, the Hammaker court also did not address the burden of proof question
because it was undisputed that the waiver provision at issue did not conform to the OWBPA’s
requirements. See Hammaker, 214 F. Supp. at 579.
71. See LeRoy, supra note 3, at 788-90 (noting that the small number of cases dealing with
employee challenges to mandatory jury waivers “underestimates the prevalence of jury waivers”
and may be just “the tip of a larger iceberg”).

CHUANG ARTICLE

218

6/30/2006 1:04:22 PM

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 10:205
72

clients to use them, litigation over such waivers is sure to increase. In
the meantime, an examination of these three initial cases suggests that
employers should tread carefully as judicial treatment of such waivers
has been unpredictable.
73
In Brown v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., a terminated employee
sued her employer for breach of employment contract and
discrimination on the basis of “sex, pregnancy and childbirth” in
violation of Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and
74
the New York City Human Rights Law. A magistrate judge
determined that plaintiff’s employment agreement, which provided,
in part that, “[Employer] and Employee shall and hereby do waive a
trial by jury in any action, proceeding or counter-claim brought or
asserted by either of the parties hereto against the other on any
matters whatsoever arising out of this Agreement” was a “‘contractual
waiver of a jury trial [that] applies to all of [Plaintiff’s] claims,
including those arising under federal and state discrimination
75
statutes.’”
The district court judge accepted the magistrate’s finding, noting
that “[j]ury trial waivers are enforced if they are knowing and
76
voluntary.” First, the court found that the jury waiver was a
conspicuous part of plaintiff’s employment agreement. Second, given
that plaintiff had an M.B.A. from Harvard and had previously
worked as an investment banker, the court found that she could
77
“have negotiated about the clause if she tried.” The court rejected
plaintiff’s argument that she did not read the employment agreement
before signing it as having “no merit,” citing authority that absent
fraud, duress, or some other wrongful act, a party is bound by the
78
contracts she signs whether or not the party has read the contract.
The Brown court did not explicitly address the proper allocation
72. See, e.g., Griffitts, supra note 26, at 2 (law firm newsletter noting more employers are
using jury waivers in their employment agreements); see also MORSE, BARNES-BROWN &
PENDLETON, P.C., EMPLOYMENT LAW ADVISOR, Apr. 2004, available at <http://www.mbbp.
com/practices/employment/ela/ela%200404%20-%20offer%20letters.pdf> (law firm newsletter
encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers); Mark N. Reinharz & Terence M.
O’Neil, Jury Waivers: An Alternative to Arbitration, THE NASSAU LAWYER (Oct. 2002),
available at <http://www.nassaubar.org/newsletter_article.cfm?ArticleID=79> (partners at the
law firm of Rains & Pogrebin, P.C. encouraging employers to consider using jury waivers).
73. 235 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
74. Id. at 292.
75. Id. at 293 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 294.
78. Id.
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of the burden of proof. However, the Brown court’s treatment of the
waiver in question suggests that it placed the burden of proof on the
plaintiff. First, the court provided no support for its finding that the
79
waiver was conspicuous. Second, although the plaintiff was highly
educated and had worked as an investment banker, it does not
necessarily follow that the clause was negotiable. The court failed to
80
cite any evidence of negotiability. There was also no evidence in the
record that the plaintiff was represented by counsel during the
81
formation of the agreement. The court’s ruling against the plaintiff
82
despite these omissions, coupled with the court’s reliance on
83
authority regarding consent to the unknown, suggest that it was
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff. By doing so, the Brown
court was able to uphold the waiver despite the paucity of evidence
showing knowing and voluntary consent to such a waiver.
84
In Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., plaintiff neurosurgeon was
85
hired as Director of Neurological Surgery by defendant clinic. The
contract required plaintiff to obtain an Iowa medical license and
plaintiff claimed the clinic’s medical director represented to her that
he had influence with the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners which
86
would enable her to obtain her license within a few weeks. Plaintiff
was subsequently unable to obtain her license and sued the clinic for,
87
inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.
Although Plaintiff demanded a jury trial, the court found that she had

79. Compare Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 603
(S.D.N.Y.1999) (finding a conspicuous jury waiver when it was written in all capital letters in the
sole paragraph on the signature page itself, it was the last sentence in that paragraph, and it
immediately preceded the parties’ signatures); see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 684-86 (“At
a minimum, courts usually look to see that the typeface was not particularly small, and that the
clause was not buried in a long agreement.”).
80. Compare Sternlight, supra note 25, at 681-82 (noting that courts examine “both any
negotiations that did take place regarding the clause, and also whether or not the clause was
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”).
81. Compare id. at 689 (observing that “numerous courts have . . . voided waivers imposed
on experienced business persons, particularly where the business person was not represented by
an attorney”).
82. See Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Progs. v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)
(noting that burden of proof refers to “the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the
party that bears the burden of [proof] must lose”).
83. See Ware, supra note 25, at 174 (stating that “a knowing-consent standard would
generally depart from contract law’s norm of consent to the unknown – that is the usual practice
of finding consent to form-contract terms about which one party is ignorant”).
84. No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110 (S.D.Iowa Jan. 29, 2004).
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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voluntarily and knowingly waived her right.
The court began by finding, with little analysis, that “the burden
of demonstrating a voluntary and knowing waiver is on the proponent
89
of the waiver.” The court then meticulously examined the formation
of the agreement. The court found evidence of negotiability given
that: (1) the contract did not have the appearance of a standardized,
take-it-or-leave it contract; (2) it was undisputed that plaintiff had
actually negotiated changes in provisions of interest to her; and (3)
there was evidence showing that plaintiff was “quite happy” with the
90
contract. The court found that there was relative parity in bargaining
power given plaintiff’s specialized qualifications and the clinic’s
91
specific needs for someone with her qualifications. Observing that
the waiver was on the fifth page of a six page agreement, that it was in
all upper case letters, and set out in a separately numbered
92
paragraph, the court found it to be conspicuous. With respect to
plaintiff’s business acumen, the court found that she was welleducated and specifically noted that she was the contract negotiations
93
manager at her prior clinic. Carefully considering all of these factors,
the court found that defendants had met their burden and
demonstrated that plaintiff had voluntarily and knowingly agreed to
94
waive her right to trial by jury.

88. Id. at *4.
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id.
93. Id. Although plaintiff also argued that she did not have the opportunity to discuss the
agreement with a lawyer, after reviewing the evidence surrounding the formation of the contract
and noting that plaintiff never sought more time to review the contract, the court discounted
this argument. Id. at *4.
94. Id. at *4. It is noteworthy that the court made this finding with some reluctance. Id. at
*5 (“Given the importance of the jury in the history and fabric of our society, the diminishing
number of civil jury trials in recent years in our district and in the state courts of Iowa is a trend
this Court is not at all anxious to encourage. However, the right to jury trial clearly may be
waived and there are many legitimate reasons why parties may wish to do so. Parties are free to
enter into agreements as to how they will resolve disputes that may arise in a business or
professional relationship. When they have voluntarily and knowingly elected to give up the right
to trial by jury it is incumbent on a court to enforce the agreement just as it would be to enforce
the right to trial by jury in the absence of such an agreement.”).
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In Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman & Worth Pub. Group, LLC,
plaintiff filed suit against her prior employer alleging that she had
been wrongly removed from her position on the basis of her age and
96
97
gender. Defendants moved to strike plaintiff’s jury demand.
The court first noted that the “burden of demonstrating a
98
plaintiff has waived her right to a jury trial is on the defendant.”
Like the court in Morris, the Schappert court then proceeded to
carefully apply the knowing consent standard.
The court found that the terms were negotiable given plaintiff’s
admission that the agreement had been negotiated and amended to
99
reflect changes made to the financial terms. The court found
100
evidence that the waiver provision was conspicuous. With respect to
bargaining power, the court stated that the fact that plaintiff
negotiated material terms of the agreement belied her argument that
101
there was a gross inequality in bargaining power. Plaintiff also did
not point to any material negative consequences of not signing the
agreement and did not deny that she could have retained her job
without signing the agreement, further demonstrating her bargaining
102
power. Finally, plaintiff herself testified that she was a “smart,”
“savvy,” “well educated,” and “experienced” business person and
that she had over two years to have the provision reviewed by her
103
attorneys. Given all these facts, the court found that defendants had
met their burden of showing that plaintiff had knowingly and
104
voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial.
Initially, it should be noted that all the employee-plaintiffs in
these cases were highly educated and the employee-plaintiffs in
Morris and Schappert were found to have wielded significant
bargaining power. As discussed in Part IV.B, this is very unusual.
Accordingly, these cases should not be relied upon for the general
proposition that pre-dispute jury waivers in employment agreements
are enforceable. Indeed, when the employee is unsophisticated and
95. No. 03 Civ. 0058(RMB), 2004 WL 1661073 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2004).
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id. at *9.
98. Id. at *11.
99. Id. at *11. The court did not address plaintiff’s argument that she understood that she
had no choice but to accept the non-financial terms. Id. at *10.
100. Id. at *11.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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lacks bargaining power, as she will be in most cases, other factors,
including the negotiability of the waiver and the conspicuousness of
the waiver, will also need to be carefully weighed and considered.
This increases the complexity of the decision making process as well
as the uncertainty of the ultimate outcome, making clear resolution of
105
the burden question all the more crucial. A review of the opinions
in Brown, Morris and Schappert, however, reveals that courts are still
grappling with the proper allocation of the burden of proof when a
party resists enforcement of a contractual jury waiver. Such
inconsistencies make it difficult to predict whether a pre-dispute jury
waiver will be enforced as shifting the burden of proof directly
changes the nature of the inquiry. When the party resisting the waiver
bears the burden of proof, as in Brown, a jury waiver can be upheld
following only a superficial inquiry. In contrast, when the burden of
proof is assigned to the party seeking to enforce the waiver, as in
Morris and Schappert, the court conducts an exhaustive factual
inquiry into the formation of the agreement before upholding a jury
waiver. This unpredictability diminishes the potential value of such
waivers. In order to encourage the appropriate use of pre-dispute jury
waivers, courts must clarify the process through which they analyze
such waivers, allocating the burden of proof in a way that takes into
account public policy considerations as well as convenience and
fairness concerns.
IV. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Since most courts substantially agree on what information is
relevant when determining whether a contractual waiver of a jury
106
trial right was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, allocation of
the burden of proof will often be determinative. When the legislature
is silent on the burden of proof, courts ordinarily allocate the burden

105. In contrast, many courts in commercial contract disputes have declined to squarely
address the burden of proof issue when is it “clear” that the waiver is valid or invalid regardless
of which party bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Allyn v. Western United Life Assur. Co., 347
F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (declining to address burden question because validity
of waiver was clearly demonstrated by the facts); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (E.D. La. 1999) (“Because the court finds clear contractual
waiver in this case, it need not determine whether the burden is on plaintiffs or defendants.”);
Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. Sevaux, 866 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Although this circuit
has not decided which party bears the burden of proving the validity of an alleged waiver, it is
clear in this case that Sevaux did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a jury trial.”).
106. See supra note 57; LaRocca, supra note 3, at 944 & n.69.
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to the party initiating the proceeding and seeking relief. But several
factors such as public policy considerations, and convenience and
108
fairness concerns, may support a different allocation of the burden.
A closer examination of pre-dispute contractual waivers against this
backdrop suggests that a different allocation of the burden is
warranted when such waivers are included in employment
agreements.
A. What is Actually Being Waived?
A pre-dispute contractual jury waiver brings two basic societal
interests into sharp relief: the right to a trial by jury and freedom of
contract. “The resolution of civil disputes by jury is of historic and
109
fundamental importance.” On the other hand, parties have the right
to contract as they see fit as long as their agreement does not violate
110
law or public policy. Accordingly, these two interests must be
weighed against one another to determine the proper allocation of
the burden of proof. As explained, infra, because pre-dispute jury
waivers interfere with the role of the jury and our public system of
dispute resolution, public policy considerations counsel against
emphasizing private contractual autonomy over the right to a jury
trial.
107. See Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S.Ct. 528, 538 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Congress has
not explicitly addressed jury waivers in the employment context. See Matties, supra note 42, at
443 (stating that no federal statute or rule specifically allows parties to waive their right to a jury
trial by way of prelitigation contract); see also David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil
Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in
Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1114-1119 (2002) (characterizing the
enforcement of jury waivers as a “judicial creation”).
108. Schaffer, 126 S. Ct. at 537-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 58, § 337, at 415.
109. Morris v. McFarland Clinic, P.C. , No. Civ. 4:03-CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *11
(S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004), at *11. For a discussion of the important purposes jury trials serve, see
Matties, supra note 42, at 434-40.
110. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 & n.11 (Tex. 2004); see, e.g.,
Am. Anglian Env. Tech., L.P. v. Env. Mgmt. Corp. 412 F.3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that
it is the policy of Missouri and nine other states “to give the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements” and collecting statutes);
Badgett v. Fed. Express Corp. 378 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (noting the importance
of the parties’ freedom of contract absent clear policy to the contrary); Allan Block Corp. v. E.
Dillon & Co., No. Civ. 04-3511JNEJGL, 2005 WL 1593010, *8 (D. Minn. July 1, 2005) (citing
Arrowhead Elec. Coop., Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 568 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997)) (“Public policy ‘requires that freedom of contract shall remain inviolate, except only in
cases which contravene public right or the public welfare.’”); see also Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693,
722 n.10 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that the Constitution contains some
protections of the right of the individual to contract); but see U.S. v. Antzoulatos 962 F.2d 720,
725 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that any substantive due process right to contract “has been sharply
curtailed”).
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First, pre-dispute jury waivers impinge upon the role of the jury
within our constitutional structure. The Seventh Amendment does
not merely confer an individual jury-trial right, but also acts as a
111
structural constraint on the power of the sovereign and the judge.
Indeed, some have called the jury “a primary check on judges’
112
power.” Thus, a jury waiver presents judges with the opportunity to
substantially increase their own power by eliminating this check.
The Supreme Court has recently highlighted the tension between
113
a judge’s power, as opposed to the jury’s, in the criminal context. In
114
U.S. v. Booker, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
115
observing that
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”),
allowing judges to find facts that enhanced a defendant’s sentence
impermissibly served to “increase the judge’s power and diminish that
116
of the jury.” The Booker Court characterized its invalidation of the
mandatory Guidelines as preserving the right of jury trial, thereby
“guaranteeing that the jury would still stand between the individual
117
and the power of the government.”
Admittedly, waivers of constitutional rights are treated

111. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 672; Matties, supra note 42, at 439-40. In an impassioned
concurrence to an opinion addressing pre-dispute arbitration clauses, Montana Supreme Court
Justice Nelson stated:
[T]he importance of the right of trial by jury derives from it having “developed in
harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative
government.” “Since the time of the Magna Carta, ‘trial by jury has been prized as a
shield against oppression . . . [and] the approaches of arbitrary power.’” This
entitlement has been “long thought to be a safeguard against tyranny.” The right to
trial by jury is a “jealously protected safeguard against government oppression.” And,
“[t]he guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and [Montana] State Constitutions reflect
a profound judgment about the way in which the law should be enforced and justice
administered.”
Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
112. Matties, supra note 42, at 465.
113. U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (holding that a sentencing judge violates
the Sixth Amendment by imposing an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant).
114. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
115. Prior to Booker, the Guidelines were a mandatory determinate sentencing scheme
applicable to federal crimes that decreed sentences within set sentencing ranges but further
allowed a judge to enhance or depart from such ranges based on facts found by the judge. See id.
at 233-37.
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id. at 236; see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (“[The right of jury trial] is
no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”).
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differently in the criminal context than in the civil context. This
distinction has been criticized given that the Supreme Court has
“never explained why constitutionally protected rights should be
afforded any less protection in the civil context than in the criminal
119
context.” While this Article does not urge the adoption of a criminal
waiver standard, the Court’s pronouncements in the criminal context
support the assertion that the jury plays an important role as a check
on the judiciary and the sovereign. Placing the burden of proof on the
party seeking enforcement of the waiver would therefore
reemphasize the role of the jury as a limiting force on judicial
discretion and power.
Second, pre-dispute jury waivers undermine a party’s procedural
right to a jury trial as enshrined within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP). Specifically, FRCP 38(a) declares: “The right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be
120
preserved to the parties inviolate.” A party that wants a jury trial
must demand one in accordance with FRCP 38; failure to do so
121
constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury.
FRCP 39(b)
further allows the court discretion to order a trial by jury
122
notwithstanding the failure of a party to properly demand a jury.
118. See Ware, supra note 25, at 181-82.
119. Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 56-57 (1997). Professor Ware posits that one of the
reasons that the Supreme Court is less protective of civil waivers is that such waivers are
contractual and thus present less danger of overreaching and duress by the party seeking to
enforce the waiver. See Ware, supra note 25, at 182 n. 88. This Article argues, however, that
given the disparity in bargaining power and legal expertise between employer and employee,
such a danger is often present in the employment context. See infra Part IV.B.
120. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(a).
121. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(d). It is important to note that the waiver provided for in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(d), which occurs during litigation and is specifically authorized by
the established rules of our procedural system, does not present the same problems as a predispute jury waiver. See infra, notes 133-36 and accompanying text; Taylor & Cliffe, supra note
107, at 1104-07. As stated by the California Supreme Court: “the initiation of a lawsuit . . .
focus[es] the attention of the litigants to produce a considered decision whether to demand —
and pay for — a jury trial based on an informed understanding of the stakes involved.” Grafton
Partners L.P. v Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 490 (Cal. 2005). Moreover, “[o]nce litigation
commences and the time to demand a jury trial approaches, parties ordinarily have counsel and
their decision whether to demand jury trial is likely to be a part of their litigation strategy.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit observed that this rule “respecting timely demand for trial by jury is a
reasonable requirement calculated to insure the orderly presentation of the business of the
court.” K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985).
122. FED. RULE CIV. P. 38(b). (“Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an
action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon
motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.”); see John D. Perovich, Discretion of
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Two of the main goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were to establish national uniformity in procedure and to eliminate
123
technical traps found in earlier procedural codes. These rules were
124
the product of much debate and deliberation by public bodies, and
are an integral part of a public system constructed to enable peaceful
and orderly resolution of disputes. A pre-dispute jury waiver
circumvents the rules by establishing a different set of procedures for
the parties bound to it and arguably allows private parties to
125
contractually limit the court’s discretion to order a trial by jury.
Enforcement of such a waiver thus defeats the goal of uniformity by
126
allowing “privately tailored procedure for individual suits.”
Contractual jury waivers also favor those parties with the means
and the ability to strategically exploit such waivers to their
127
advantage; and in the context of employment agreements, that party
128
Therefore, these waivers not only impose
is the employer.
procedures inconsistent with publicly-established ones, but fashion
those procedures in such a way as to favor the same party nearly
every time: the employer.
A court that blindly espouses freedom of contract concerns when
examining a pre-dispute jury waiver ignores the role of the jury as a
check on the government’s power as well as the waiver’s
encroachment upon our public dispute resolution system. This
concern is especially acute when the system is disrupted in such a way
as to consistently favor the same party. In recognition of society’s
interest in a public dispute resolution system that is fundamentally
fair and the disruptive effect of a jury waiver on the fairness of that
system, the burden of proof should be placed on the party seeking to
enforce the waiver.

District Court Under Rule 39(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Authorizing it to Order Jury
Trial Notwithstanding Party’s Failure to Make Seasonable Demand for Jury, 6 A.L.R. FED. 217 §
4 (2005) (discussing extent of court’s discretion to order jury trial).
123. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1103; see also Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 602 (2005) (“The Rules, expressive of and coupled with an
impressive investment in the infrastructure of the federal courts, represent a normative
commitment to federal regulatory power.”).
124. Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1100.
125. Once a pre-litigation agreement is found to be valid, “courts in near knee-jerk fashion
provide automatic specific performance without acknowledging any necessity for first examining
the prerequisites for specific performance or injunctive relief required for a ‘normal’ contract.’”
Id. at 1127.
126. Id. at 1127.
127. Id. at 1103-04.
128. See infra, Part IV.B.
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B. The Coercive Employer-Employee Relationship
Employers possess distinct advantages over employees in both
bargaining power and in their ability to assess the feasibility and the
likely benefit of alternative dispute resolution methods. These
advantages, as well as the risk of coercion inherent in the employeremployee relationship, decrease the probability that knowing and
voluntary consent to a jury waiver can be obtained. These
considerations further support placing the burden of proof on the
party seeking to enforce the pre-dispute jury waiver.
Employment contracts “are susceptible to the presence of
129
unconscionable terms,” because they are typically offered on a
“take-it or leave-it” basis, drafted entirely by employers, and offered
130
for employees to sign as a condition of employment.
Most
applicants lack bargaining power because rejecting the employment
131
agreement is not a viable alternative. This dilemma discourages
applicants from exercising any effort to understand what they are

129. Gooden v. Village Green Mgmt. Co., No. Civ. 02-835 (JRT/SRN), 2002 WL 31557689,
at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2002) (noting that the “unique nature” of employment contracts
“should subject them to special scrutiny”); see Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 107, at 1087 (noting
that “there is a great opportunity for unfairness” when pre-litigation agreements are
incorporated into employment agreements).
130. Gooden, 2002 WL 31557689, at *3; see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 532 U.S. 105,
139 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that many employees lack bargaining power); Daniel
Roy, Note, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1360 (1999) (“When employees are
presented with such form agreements, they are not ‘asked’ by their employers to accept, or
make a counter-offer. They are instead required to accept, or look for another job.”); Steven
Cherensky, Note, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment
Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 597, 621 (1993) (“Today, the majority
of employment contracts are offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.”).
131. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000) (observing that “the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most soughtafter employees may be particularly acute” and that “few employees are in a position to refuse a
job because of an arbitration requirement”); Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory
Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861, 871 (2004) (“In the end, the employee’s choice is between a job
in which employment discrimination disputes are arbitrated and no job whatsoever. Such a
choice is really no choice at all.”); William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr.,
Modifications Necessary for Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against
Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion and Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 29, 72-73 (1998) (noting employees may lack the personal economic security and
effective bargaining power to avoid unfavorable terms in employment agreements); Lucy T.
France & Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims in the Workplace: No
Enforceability Without Equivalency, 64 MONT. L. REV. 449, 463 (2003) (“Most employees lack
bargaining power. Rarely do non-management level employees negotiate the terms of their
employment at arms length.”); Reilly, supra note 25, at 1258-59 (arguing that efforts to find
other jobs are curtailed by limited information and resources and by the view that jobs are a
person’s most valuable possession and that meaningful choices between jobs assumes worker
mobility and healthy job market).
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waiving.
Even if an applicant wishes to carefully deliberate over the terms
of the proffered employment agreement, and is granted the
opportunity to do so, most lack the means to adequately evaluate the
impact of a jury waiver. By definition, a pre-dispute jury waiver is
presented and agreed to prior to litigation. Thus, at the time the right
is waived, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the
dispute that may arise from the agreement. Yet the nature of the
dispute is a crucial factor when considering whether to ask for a jury
133
trial. Cases with simple issues and good witnesses and which involve
the potential for emotionally based damages are often the best in
134
which to demand a jury. Complex cases, and those cases that rely
135
heavily on legal issues, are poorer for jury treatment. The nature of
the actual dispute also appreciably affects the cost-benefit analysis, as
136
cases tried to a jury cost more than those tried to a judge.
Employers are “repeat players in the employment
137
marketplace” and are more educated and skilled in legal matters
than employees. Thus, they are more likely to take these concerns
into account, given that they have better access to legal information,
greater expertise with drafting and negotiating employment
agreements, and more experience with taking cases to trial.
Most employees, on the other hand, do not even think that
sometime in the future they may become involved in legal disputes
with their employers, let alone carefully weigh the ramifications of
something as abstract as waiving their right to a jury trial in a case
that has yet to be filed, regarding a dispute that has yet to
138
139
materialize. Their ignorance of the law and other “cognitive
140
biases” prevent employees from realizing the significance of what
132. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1235 (“A potential employee is unlikely to devote resources to
try to understand something that he or she cannot change or escape.”).
133. Custis, supra note 15, at § 8:32.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1236-37.
138. See id. at 1229-30 (noting that many employees dismiss the possibility of engaging in a
dispute with their employers); see also Howard v. Bank South, N.A., 433 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Ga.
App. 1993) (finding that since plaintiff could not have known when he signed the contract what
the basis and circumstances of a future claim on that contract might be, his waiver of jury trial
could not have been knowing and voluntary).
139. Reilly, supra note 25, at 1225 (“Most employees have little knowledge of their legal
rights in employment.”).
140. Some cognitive biases include a systematic underestimation of risk and the use of a
small sample of positive or neutral interactions as reliable predictors of the relationship in the
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they are agreeing to. Therefore, at the time the waiver is entered into,
most employees have not adequately considered the consequences of
waiving their right to a jury.
This disparity in power, expertise and resources creates a twofold problem for employees. The employer’s greater expertise and
resources produces employment agreements that are naturally
drafted in terms that favor the employer. This means that the
employer determines whether or not a jury waiver provision will be
inserted into the employment agreement in the first instance. And
since employees are in the unenviable position of having neither
bargaining power nor legal expertise, these employment agreements,
which already heavily favor the employer, are rarely negotiated.
Consequently, employment agreements, and jury waivers in
particular, are entered into with little deliberation by the employee,
despite the evident biases against them.
Clearly, the employer’s resources and expertise make it better
able to demonstrate that a pre-dispute jury waiver was entered into
knowingly and voluntarily. However, this is not the only reason it
141
should bear the burden of proof.
A frequent significant
consideration in the allocation of the burden of proof is the judicial
142
estimate of the probabilities of the situation. That is, “it is usually
fairer to act as if the exceptional situation did not exist and therefore
to place the burden of proof and persuasion on the party claiming its
143
existence.” With respect to pre-dispute jury waivers entered into
between employers and employees, knowing and voluntary consent
to such a waiver would be exceptional, given the employer’s natural
advantages in light of the employee’s natural disadvantages, and the
likelihood of bias and coercion. As an example, consider Elizabeth,
the hypothetical employee presented at the beginning of this Article.
Elizabeth has only a high school education and applied for an entrylevel job with a large corporation. Her education level, the complexity
of the legal right being waived, and the large number of potential
applicants qualified for that same position make it highly unlikely that
her employer invested the time required to ensure that Elizabeth’s

future. Id. at 1228-34.
141. See Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 528 (2005)
(noting that courts “do not automatically assign the burden of proof to the side with the bigger
guns”).
142. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 58, § 337.
143. Id.
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waiver was knowing and voluntary. This probability, coupled with
the employer’s superior access to legal information and greater
resources, warrant assigning the burden to the employer.
C. Assigning the Burden of Proof
Allocating the burden of proof to the party seeking enforcement
of the waiver strikes the appropriate balance between freedom of
145
contract and the right to a jury trial. First, employment agreements
are uniquely susceptible to unfair terms. Second, the parties to those
agreements differ greatly with respect to their bargaining power and
legal sophistication. Third, it is more likely than not that a jury waiver
will not be entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Fourth, predispute jury waivers diminish the role of the jury and circumvent our
public dispute resolution system. Thus, sound public policy,
convenience and fairness concerns all establish that the burden of
demonstrating that a jury waiver was voluntary and knowing is

144. But it is not unheard of. In Gentry v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Cal. App.,
rev. granted and depublished, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 5122 (Cal. Apr. 26, 2006), the employer provided
a dispute resolution packet to its workers pursuant to which employees were afforded various
options, including arbitration, for resolving employment-related disputes and given thirty days
to opt out of the arbitration agreement. Id. at 791-92. The employer also provided employees
with a handbook that pointed out both the advantages and disadvantages of electing arbitration.
Id. at 794. The Gentry court found that such an arbitration agreement was not adhesive and was
not unconscionable. Id. at 793-94; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198,
1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because employee was
given thirty days to decide whether to participate in the program, the terms of the arbitration
agreement were “clearly spelled out” in written materials and a video tape presentation, and
employee was encouraged to contact employer’s representatives or to consult an attorney prior
to deciding whether to participate in the program). Since review has been granted in Gentry, its
holding is questionable; however, materials and procedures similar to those implemented by the
employer in Gentry could conceivably be used to increase the likelihood that an employee’s
waiver of her right to a jury trial is knowing and voluntary.
145. But see Joel Andersen, Note, The Indulgence of Reasonable Presumptions: Federal
Court Contractual Civil Jury Trial Waivers, 102 MICH. L. REV. 104, 112 & n.50 (2003). Andersen
advocates for the use of a permissive presumption in cases involving pre-dispute jury waivers.
Id. at 111. Using the permissive presumption, if a party claims her waiver was not knowing and
voluntary then the court may find that there was no waiver even if her claim is the only
evidence. Id. at 116-17. However, the court may still find against the party resisting enforcement
of the waiver if the evidence is “weak.” Id. at 117. Andersen argues that this presumption
protects the right to a jury trial and the contractual interests of the parties while leaving intact
the “normal mechanisms found in an ordinary contract dispute.” Id. According to Anderson,
shifting the burden of production and persuasion to the party seeking to enforce the waiver does
not adequately protect freedom of contract. Id. at 116 n.86. But, as argued in this Article, in the
context of employment agreements, society’s interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by
the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, convenience and fairness concerns warrant assigning the
burden of proof to the party with greater expertise and resources, and the party claiming the
existence of an unlikely situation, which in most cases is an employer seeking enforcement of a
pre-dispute jury waiver.
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146

properly placed on the proponent of the waiver.
147
Applying this allocation to the Brown case demonstrates how
significantly it can affect the outcome. In Brown, plaintiff claimed
that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, her
employer must persuade the court that plaintiff’s waiver was knowing
and voluntary in light of the following factors: (1) negotiability of the
contract terms; (2) conspicuousness of the waiver provision; (3) the
relative bargaining power of the parties; and (4) the business acumen
of the party opposing the waiver. The employer presents evidence
that the waiver was conspicuous and that plaintiff had an M.B.A.
from Harvard and was formerly employed as an investment banker.
No evidence is presented regarding the negotiability of the contract
terms or the relative bargaining power of the parties. Plaintiff
presents evidence that she did not even read the waiver before
signing it. Because the burden of proof is on the employer, failure to
present any evidence to suggest that the contract terms were
negotiable and/or that the plaintiff had some modicum of bargaining
power means that the employer has not satisfied its burden. In light of
the evidence presented, the court would clearly find that the
employer failed to meet its burden and would disregard the waiver.
V. CONCLUSION
Bench trials offer distinct advantages over arbitration and jury
trials. But as parties attempt to leverage these advantages by using
pre-dispute contractual jury waivers to manage litigation risk and
146. This is not the approach the courts take with mandatory employment arbitration, even
though an agreement to arbitrate includes a waiver of jury trial rights. See Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 695-96.
Courts have generally held that the opponent of an arbitration clause bears the burden of
showing that the clause is inconsistent with federal law or invalid as a matter of contract law. Id.
at 707-08. Courts have supported their more lenient treatment of mandatory arbitration by
citing the federal policy favoring arbitration contained in the Federal Arbitration Act. See
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also Sternlight, supra note 25, at 696. But there is no comparable
federal policy favoring bench trials over jury trials. This Article argues that the Constitution and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evidence a policy favoring jury trials over bench trials. See
supra Part IV.A. Accordingly, in this respect, the judicial treatment of arbitration agreements is
not relevant. Indeed, the California Supreme Court relied on a similar rationale to explain its
decision to recognize arbitration agreements while striking down pre-dispute jury waivers.
Grafton Partners L.P. v. Super. Ct., 116 P.3d 479, 480 (Cal. 2005) (noting the strong state policy
favoring arbitration, the absence of any state policy favoring court trials and a “long standing
public policy in favor of trial by jury”). The Grafton court went on to state that it is rational to
promote pre-dispute arbitration agreements “while not according the same advantage to jury
trial waivers” because arbitration “conserves judicial resources far more than the selection of a
court trial over a jury trial.” Id.
147. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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cost, it is important to clarify judicial enforcement of such waivers to
encourage their thoughtful and appropriate use. This Article argues
that public policy considerations, coupled with convenience and
fairness concerns, call for assigning the burden of proving the validity
of a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver to the party seeking
enforcement of the waiver. By assigning the burden of proof in this
way, courts can ensure that such waivers are treated consistently.
Consistent judicial treatment of pre-dispute contractual waivers will,
in turn, allow such waivers to be used appropriately.

